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Abstract. Formalizing case-based reasoning is an important topic in AI and Law,
which has been discussed using various approaches, such as formal dialogue games,
abstract dialectical frameworks. In this paper we model case-based reasoning by
using the formal argument semantics of case models. With the precedent models
we present, the validity of legal arguments in the case-based reasoning process can
be shown formally. We also present a case study of precedent models in a real legal
domain and evaluate the validity of arguments in case-based reasoning.
Keywords. legal argumentation, case-based reasoning, precedent
1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the formalization of case-based reasoning within the case model
formalism developed in [1]. Case-based reasoning is an important topic in AI and Law.
Research in this topic is associated with argumentation as arguments are main outcomes
in case-based reasoning, which are given by the parties in courts to defend their positions.
Notions in case-based reasoning such as case comparisons and legal argument evaluation
are good examples of computational argumentation theory.
As summarized by Bench-Capon [2], HYPO and its successors have exercised great
influence in the study of case-based reasoning. Ashley and other researchers model legal
reasoning by representing cases with factors [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. With a current situation,
users can retrieve precedents according to the shared factors between precedents and the
situation, and try to analogize and distinguish them.
Case-based reasoning can be formalized and connected with other reasoning ap-
proaches. Hafner and Berman discuss the role of context in case-based reasoning [9].
Wyner and his colleagues discuss the relation between cases and arguments [10]. Prakken
and Sartor [11] model case-based reasoning in a formal dialogue game and combine
case-based reasoning with rule-based reasoning. Prakken and his colleagues [12] also
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model case-based reasoning with ASPIC+ framework [13]. Horty and Bench-Capon [14]
present a formalism on case-based reasoning with reason models that combine facts,
rules and outcomes in precedents. Horty formalizes dimensions in case-based reason-
ing instead of standard factors [15]. Al-Abdulkarim and her colleagues [16] formalize
CATO with abstract dialectical frameworks [17]. Other approaches include dialectical
arguments [18], ontologies in OWL [19] and abstract argumentation [20].
In [1], Verheij presents a form of argumentation theory which formally defines the
validity of arguments through case models [21]. A case model is a set of cases combined
with a preference relation. The theory has been implemented in a Prolog program [22].
With case models, the validity of generated arguments and attacks can be distinguished
in coherent, presumptive and conclusive validity. It provides formal semantics for com-
bining rules, arguments and cases [1]. With this approach, we can analyze case-based
reasoning with logical tools and evaluate arguments formally.
Outline: we show the theory part of the precedent model formalism based on Ver-
heij’s approach in Section 2. We give a case study of precedent models in a real legal
domain in Section 3. We discuss how arguments’ validity can be used in case-based rea-
soning in Section 4. We also compare our approach with others in the discussion section.
2. Precedent models
The precedent models defined in this section are based on the case models formalism
addressed by Verheij [1]. The formalism introduced in this paper uses a propositional
logic language L generated from a set of propositional constants. We write ¬ for nega-
tion, ∧ for conjunction, ∨ for disjunction, ↔ for equivalence. The associated classical,
deductive, monotonic consequence relation is denoted .
Precedents consist of factors and outcomes. Both factors and outcomes are literals.
A literal is either a propositional constant or its negation. We use F ⊆ L to represent a set
of factors, O⊆ L to represent a set of outcomes. The sets F and O are disjoint and consist
only of literals. If a propositional constant p is in F (or O), then ¬p is also in F (respec-
tively in O). A factor represents an element of a case, namely a factual circumstance. Its
negation describes the opposite fact. For instance, if a factor ϕ is “A kills B”, then its
negation ¬ϕ is “A does not kill B”. An outcome always favors a side in the precedent,
its negation favors the opposite side. For instance, an outcome ω is “A is guilty”, its
negation ¬ω is “A is not guilty”.
Following existing work in case-based reasoning, a precedent is a logical consistent
conjunction of factors and outcomes. If a precedent contains an outcome, then we say it
is a proper precedent. If a precedent doesn’t have any outcome, then it is a situation that
describes a current case. The outcomes of these situations need to be decided upon.
Definition 1 (Precedents) A precedent is a logically consistent conjunction of distinct
factors and outcomes π = ϕ0∧ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕm∧ω0 ∧ω1∧ . . .∧ωn−1, where m and n are
non-negative integers. We say that ϕ0,ϕ1, ...,ϕm are the factors of π , ω0,ω1, ...,ωn−1 are
the outcomes of π . If n = 0, then we say that π is a situation with no outcomes, otherwise
π is a proper precedent.
Notice that both m and n can be equal to 0. When m = 0, there is one single factor.
When n = 0, the precedent has no outcome and the empty conjunction ω0∧ . . .∧ωn−1 is
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Precedent 1
Precedent 2
f1∧¬ f2∧¬o f1∧ f2∧o
Figure 1. An example of precedent model
equivalent to . Figure 1 shows two precedents. f1, f2 and ¬ f2 are factors, o and ¬o are
outcomes.
We do not assume precedents are complete descriptions. That is, factors may exist
which do not occur in the precedent. Furthermore, we do not assume that the negation of
a factor holds when the factor does not occur in the precedent.
A precedent model is a set of logically incompatible precedents forming a total pre-
order that can represent a preference among the precedents. This preference relation is
determined by the purpose of the models, for instance, in the precedent model shown in
Section 3, precedents are equally preferred because of the setting of HYPO.
Definition 2 (Precedent models) A precedent model is a pair (P,≥), such that: P is a set
of precedents; for all π,π ′ ∈ P with π 
= π ′, π ∧π ′ ⊥; and ≥ is a total preorder on P.
The strict weak order > between two precedents π and π ′ is standardly associated with a
total preorder≥ which is defined as π > π ′ if and only if it is not the case that π ′ ≥ π (for
π and π ′ ∈ P). When π > π ′, we say that π is (strictly) preferred to π ′. The associated
equivalence relation ∼ is defined as π ∼ π ′ if and only if π ≥ π ′ and π ′ ≥ π .
Precedent models are case models as defined in [1, Definition 2.1]:
Proposition 1 Let (P,≥) be a precedent model. The following properties hold, for all




 π ↔ π ′, then  ¬(π ∧π ′);
3. If  π ↔ π ′, then π = π ′;
4. π ≥ π ′ or π ′ ≥ π;
5. If π ≥ π ′ and π ′ ≥ π ′′, then π ≥ π ′′.
The proof is straightforward and is omitted. Figure 1 shows an example of a precedent
model. The preference relation of this model is Precedent 1 > Precedent 2, and is denoted
by the size of the boxes directly.
The definitions of arguments, attacks and their validities in case models [1] can be
applied to precedent models. Precedents are considered as the cases made by arguments.
In Figure 1, Precedent 1 is the case made by the argument from f1∧¬ f2 to ¬o.
Definition 3 (Arguments [1]) An argument from χ to ρ is a pair (χ,ρ) with χ and ρ ∈ L.
For λ ∈ L, if χ  λ , λ is a premise of the argument; if ρ  λ , λ is a conclusion; if
χ ∧ ρ  λ , λ is a position in the case made by the argument. We say that χ expresses
the full premise of the argument, ρ the full conclusion, and χ ∧ρ its full position, also
referred to as the case made by the argument.
Arguments have three kinds of validities. If an argument is logically implied by one of
the precedents in a precedent model, then the argument is coherently valid in the prece-
dent model. If all precedents in a precedent model logically implying an argument’s full
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premise also logically imply its full conclusion, then the argument is conclusively valid
in the precedent model. If an argument’s conclusion is logically implied by a precedent
which is the most preferred among the precedents that logically imply the argument’s
full premise, then the argument is presumptively valid in the precedent model.
Definition 4 (Validity of arguments [1]) Let (P,≥) be a precedent model. We define, for
all χ,ρ ∈ L:
1. argument (χ,ρ) is coherently valid with respect to the precedent model if and only
if ∃π ∈ P : π  χ ∧ρ . We then write (P,≥)  (χ,ρ);
2. argument (χ,ρ) is conclusively valid with respect to the precedent model if and
only if ∃π ∈ P : π  χ∧ρ and for all π ∈ P: if π  χ , then π  χ∧ρ . We then write
(P,≥)  χ ⇒ ρ;
3. argument (χ,ρ) is presumptively valid with respect to the precedent model if and
only if ∃π ∈ P:
(a) π  χ ∧ρ; and
(b) for all π ′ ∈ P: if π ′  χ, then π ≥ π ′.
We then write (P,≥)  χ  ρ .
In the precedent model of Figure 1, the following are true:
1. (P,≥)  ( f1,o), as Precedent 2 logically implies this argument;
2. (P,≥)  f2 ⇒ o, as all precedents in the model which logically imply f2 also logi-
cally imply o.
3. (P,≥) f1 ¬o, as Precedent 1 logically implies¬o and that is the most preferred
precedent which logically implies f1 in the model.
Definition 5 (Successful attacks [1]) Let (P,≥) be a precedent model, and (χ,ρ) be a
presumptively valid argument:
1. τ ∈ L is a successful attack of argument (χ,ρ) if and only if (χ ∧ τ,ρ) is not a
presumptively valid argument, then we say (P,≥)  χ  ρ× τ;
2. If argument (χ ∧ τ,ρ) is not coherently valid, then we say successful attack τ is
excluding;
3. If ∃π ∈ P, and π  χ ∧ τ , then we say π provides grounding for the successful
attack τ;
In the precedent model shown above, we have (P,≥)  f1  ¬o× f2, it is an excluding
successful attack, Precedent 2 provides grounding for this successful attack.
The comparisons are based on Definition 3.1 and 3.4 in [1]. Analogies between two
precedents are the properties that follow logically from both two precedents. Distinctions
are the unshared properties between two precedents, namely the properties that only
follow logically from one of the precedents but not the other one.
Definition 6 (Precedent comparisons) Let π,π ′ ∈ L be two precedents, we define:
1. a sentence α ∈ L is an analogy between π and π ′ if and only if π ∨π ′  α .
2. a sentence δ ∈ L is a π-π ′ distinction if and only if π  δ and π ′ 
 δ .
A π-π ′ distinction is a distinction in π with respect to π ′. Both π-π ′ distinctions and π ′-π
distinctions are called the distinctions between π and π ′.
Comparing the two precedents in Figure 1, f1 is an analogy between them, f2 is a dis-
tinction in Precedent 2 with respect to Precedent 1. Note that the outcomes are also dis-
tinctions between them as these precedents are decided differently.
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Precedent model Situation
American Precision Yokana Mason
F7 ∧ F16 ∧ F21 ∧ Pla F7 ∧ F10 ∧ F16 ∧ Def F1 ∧ F6 ∧ F15 ∧ F16 ∧ F21
Figure 2. Precedent model for the Mason case
3. Case study: HYPO in precedent models
In this section, we give a case study of precedent models using a legal domain studied in
HYPO, namely the trade secret law in the United States [3, 23].
The precedent model (P,P×P) in this case study contains two precedents (i.e. the
Yokana case2 and the American Precision case3), which have been discussed in [23,
Chapter 3.3.2]. Notice that P×P denotes the trivial preference relation where all prece-
dents are equivalent. The current situation is adapted from the Mason case4. The prece-
dents in this model have equal preference. We assume the set of outcomes O= {Pla,Def}
and  Def↔¬Pla. Pla stands for plaintiff wins the claim, Def stands for defendant wins
the claim. The Yokana case favors defendant and the American Precision case favors
plaintiff. As shown in Figure 2, both of them share some factors with the Mason case.
In the case-based reasoning process with these two precedents, arguments [23, Fig-
ure 3.2] can be generated for discussing the current situation:
1. (F16,Def) Defendant cites the Yokana case in order to give a statement that defen-
dant should win the case. F16 is an analogy between the Yokana case and situation.
2. (F10,Pla) and (F6∧ F15∧ F21,Pla) Plaintiff distinguishes the Yokana case by
pointing out distinctions (F10 and F6∧ F15∧ F21) in order to suggest that the
situation should be decided differently.
3. (F16∧F21,Pla) Plaintiff also cites a more on point counterexample (the American
Precision case) which shares more factors (F16∧F21) with the situation.
4. (F1,Def) and (F7,Def) Defendant distinguishes the counterexample, namely the
American Precision case, by using factor F1 and F7.
The evaluation of these arguments is shown as below:
(P,P×P)  F16  Def (P,P×P) 
 (F10,Pla)
(P,P×P) 
 (F6∧F15∧F21,Pla) (P,P×P)  F16∧F21⇒ Pla
(P,P×P) 
 (F1,Def) (P,P×P)  F7  Def
The evaluation shows that arguments for analogizing the Yokana case and the American
Precision case with the Mason case are at least presumptively valid in the model, while
most of the arguments for distinguishing them with the situation are incoherent.
Some factors can be considered as successful attacks of arguments in case-based
reasoning. For instance:
(P,P×P)  F16∧F21  Pla×F1 (P,P×P)  F16  Def×F6
(P,P×P)  F16  Def×F15 (P,P×P)  F16  Def×F21
2Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411 (3rd Cir.1961)
3American Precision Vibrator Co. v. National Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988)
4Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So.2d 130 (Ala.Civ.App.1987)
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According to Definition 5, all these attacks are excluding. The American Precision case
provides grounding for the attack F21 on argument (F16,Def), and there is no precedent
that can provide grounding for other successful attacks above.
4. Preliminary evaluation of arguments’ validity in case-based reasoning
In this section, we discuss the validity of arguments in case-based reasoning. The ap-
proach we use to construct precedent models allows us to evaluate the arguments’ va-
lidity in case-based reasoning, which can give reasons for why such argument moves in
the reasoning process can be taken. For instance, the argument citing the Yokana case
is presumptively valid, but the one based on American precision is even conclusive, and
hence stronger in a formal sense.
The evaluation of arguments’ validity provides a strategy to manipulate arguments in
case-based reasoning, which is aiming for improving arguments’ validity. By this action,
the arguer’s standpoint can be more acceptable to the judge. For instance, in the case
study, if defendants find a favorable precedent which contains factor F7 and F1, then
the level of validity of the argument they used for distinguishing the American Precision
case with the Mason case will become conclusive, which makes their distinction more
acceptable.
Using an incoherent argument can make sense and break new ground. A decision
based on such an argument can be considered as going beyond the current legal sta-
tus modeled in the precedent model. After adding a precedent incorporating such a
groundbreaking decision, the previously incoherent argument can become coherent in
the adapted model. For instance, if Mason’s decision favors plaintiff, then in the cur-
rent precedent model (F1∧F6∧F15∧F16∧F21,Pla) is incoherent, but in the precedent
model with the decided version of Mason included as third precedent it is coherent.
Precedents can be compared not only by the shared factors, but also by the prefer-
ence relation in precedent models. The precedent model in Section 3 has equal prefer-
ence, but this relation can change if the precedents are from different court level. Even
with the same facts, a higher level court can make a decision which is opposite to the
decision of a lower level court. Assume for instance that the precedent model in the case
study has another precedent from a higher court level with the same factors as the Amer-
ican Precision case but opposite outcome, and it is more preferred than other precedents,
then the argument (F16∧F21,Def) is presumptively valid, while (F16∧F21,Pla) is only
coherent. Although they share the same factors with the situation, the precedent from
higher court level can still be considered as a better one, since the argument for citing it
has stronger validity.
5. Discussion
In this section, we compare our precedent models with other relevant research.
Starting with HYPO, we observe that HYPO represents factors with dimensions,
which can represent graduality or strength (very low - low - neutral - high - very high). In
precedent models, factors are more similar to the notion in CATO [7], namely all factors
are binary, and either can be found in a case or not. A pair of opposite factors in our
models can be considered as the two extremes (very low and very high) of a dimension.
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Precedent models are an extension of the case model formalism in [1], which briefly
discussed case analogies and distinctions. Cases in case models are abstract in the sense
that factors and outcomes are not distinguished as in our notion of precedents. With the
precedent models, we therefore are able to describe elements of case-based reasoning in
formal logic while staying closer to notions studied in HYPO.
In other case-based reasoning models [11, 12, 14, 16], case-based reasoning has
been modeled in terms of a formal dialogue game [11], in terms of ASPIC+ framework
[12], in terms of a reason model [14], and in terms of abstract dialectical frameworks
[16]. The theory we use is in terms of a propositional logical language.
Precedents in [11] are represented with sets of rules, expressing which factors favor
an outcome and which detract from it. They also describe factors as a kind of rules in
order to represent the conflict resolution between the pro and con factors. Precedents in
[12] are sets of factors, they use predicates in a first-order language to describe factors
in precedents. Horty and Bench-Capon [14] represent precedents as a combination of
rules, facts and outcome. The representation method used by Al-Abdulkarim and her
colleagues is related to the factor hierarchy used in CATO [7]. In our precedent models,
precedents are represented with conjunctions of factors and outcomes instead of sets or
hierarchies. Rules can be translated to our arguments, and therefore the validity of rules
can vary in our models.
The meaning of the preference relation is also different. In [11, 12, 14], the prefer-
ence relation is used inside a precedent, it is either between rules [11] which is deter-
mined by which rule has the priority, or between factors [12, 14] which is determined
by the outcome of the precedent. A similar notion of preference relation is also used in
[16], which comes from prioritized abstract dialectical frameworks. It is used for com-
paring factors in the hierarchy. In our approach, the preference relation is a relation be-
tween precedents. For instance, in our precedent model for HYPO-style reasoning (Sec-
tion 3), precedents are with equal preference. In the case model for Dutch tort law [1],
the preference of cases are different in order to represent which cases are exceptional.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study case-based reasoning with precedent models and how to formal-
ize arguments’ validity with the formal logical semantics of precedent models. This ap-
proach shows that Verheij’s formalism [1], which uses a formal, logical language, can be
used to formally model elements of case-based reasoning. The use of precedent models
allows for the logical evaluation of arguments grounded in past cases. Since past cases
can be considered as a kind of data, and valid arguments show patterns that hold in the
data, the approach provides a step in the development of hybrid AI systems that combine
structured knowledge grounded in data [24].
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